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The Federal Reserve’s Financial Crisis Response A: 
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Rosalind Z. Wiggins2 and Andrew Metrick3,4 
Yale Program on Financial Stability Case Study 2015-1a-v2 
July 15, 2015, revised: July 15, 2020 
Abstract 
Beginning in summer 2007, the Federal Reserve (the Fed) was called upon to address a 
severe disruption in the interbank lending markets sparked by a downturn in the subprime 
mortgage market. As these developments began to impact the ability of banks to raise 
adequate funding, the Fed encouraged them to utilize the Discount Window (DW), its 
standing facility for lending to depository institutions, and repeatedly decreased the lending 
rate to make the facility more accessible. Despite the Fed’s efforts, for a number of reasons, 
including historical perceptions of stigma, banks were reluctant to utilize the DW. In 
December 2007, the Federal Reserve introduced the Term Auction Facility (TAF), which 
provided term loans via auction utilizing the same collateral that could have been used at the 
DW. The TAF was immediately and aggressively utilized and would become one of the largest 
facilities employed by the Fed to combat the financial crisis. Ultimately, the Fed lent a total 
of $3.8 trillion to 416 banks under the TAF. This case examines the Fed’s use of the DW and 
the TAF to provide liquidity to depository institutions in fighting the financial crisis. 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
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1.  Introduction 
On August 9, 2007, the French bank BNP Paribas5 announced that it was suspending 
redemptions from two of its investment funds that held substantial portfolios of subprime 
mortgages because of an inability to value the funds. The increasing turmoil in the subprime 
mortgage market was creating illiquidity in the secondary market. This announcement set 
off a panic among investors that led to a sudden contraction in lending as institutions pulled 
back from investments that they perceived as having increased risk. The downturn in the 
subprime mortgage market quickly collapsed the asset-backed securities commercial paper 
(ABCP) market, which incorporated many subprime mortgages, and then spread to other 
parts of the interbank funding markets. Despite having large depository sources of funds, 
banks also relied on ABCP and securitization to fund their operations. As these markets 
contracted, banks and other financial institutions soon experienced difficulty in meeting 
their funding needs. There was concern that institutions would begin to tighten their lending 
standards slowing their lending to business and households and impacting the economy 
beyond the financial system. 
The Federal Reserve (the Fed) responded quickly to the tightening in the credit markets by 
cutting the primary credit rate, the main rate at which it lends to depository institutions 
through its Discount Window (DW), its main standing facility for providing liquidity to 
eligible institutions. However, banks were reluctant to borrow from the DW for a number of 
reasons including that they were afraid that doing so would be perceived as a sign of financial 
weakness. When pressures in the credit markets continued, the Fed enacted, in December 
2007, the Term Auction Facility (TAF), an innovative auction funding program to make 
needed liquidity accessible to depository institutions and maintain the flow of credit 
throughout the economy. 
In this case we explore the Fed’s use of its conventional monetary policy tools as lender of 
last resort to provide critical liquidity to depository institutions during the Global Financial 
Crisis. Section 2 discusses the basics of the Fed’s lending powers; Section 3 discusses the DW, 
while Section 4 discusses the problems of stigma associated with the DW; Section 5 explains 
in detail the TAF; and lastly, Section 6 examines the impact of the DW and TAF lending during 
the crisis.   
_____________________________________________________________________ 
5 See Bloyd (2007).  
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1. What is the primary function of the Discount Window and was it an effective tool in 
the Federal Reserve’s efforts to combat the crisis? Why? Why not?  
2. The Fed reduced the federal funds rate 10 times between August 2007 and December 
2008 to an unprecedented low level. During that same period, it also adjusted the 
spread between the federal funds rate and the DW’s primary credit rate. Considering 
the timing and magnitude of these changes, were they effective in serving their 
intended purpose?  
3. What other options were available to the Fed to provide banks with the needed 
liquidity? Why do you think these other options were not implemented?  
4. What were the intended advantages of the TAF over the DW? What elements of the 
TAF affected these advantages? Were these advantages realized in the operation of the 
TAF? 
5. Did the DW and TAF effectively complement each other? Were there redundancies 
that could have been avoided? What does the co-existence of these two programs 
reveal about the Fed’s tools for fighting the crisis?  
2. The Federal Reserve’s Lending Powers  
In its role as lender of last resort (LOLR) and keeper of monetary policy, the Fed has three 
basic tools: reserve requirements, the DW and open market operations (OMOs). The Fed sets 
the amount of reserves that depository institutions are required to maintain with it to secure 
their operations. The Fed makes loans available to depository institutions6 through the DW 
at rates established by the Fed, the discount rate. Through adjustments via its OMOs (repo 
and reverse repo loans with primary dealers), the Fed influences the demand for and amount 
of balances that depository institutions in aggregate hold at the Fed, and therefore the 
targeted federal funds rate.  
Traditionally, the prime credit rate at the DW has been 100 basis points higher than the 
target federal funds rate.7 This made the DW less attractive and more expensive, consistent 
with the Fed’s role as LOLR. DW loans are made to banks by their regional Federal Reserve 
Bank with which they have established a relationship and posted collateral. DW lending is 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
6 The Fed only has authority to lend to depository institutions and bank holding companies through its Discount 
Window. A broader group of firms, including the primary dealers, some who are not depository institutions, 
may borrow from the OMOs, and thus, access funds at the federal funds rate. (See Wiggins and Metrick 2016B 
for a discussion of the Fed’s use of these mechanisms to provide liquidity to Primary Dealers during the crisis.) 
7 There are actually three rates at the Discount Window. The primary credit rate is available to banks in sound 
financial condition. The secondary credit rate is available to banks that are not eligible for the primary credit 
rate. The seasonal credit rate applies to loans provided to usually smaller banks that experience a recurring 
variation in seasonal liquidity demand, usually banks serving agriculture, tourism, or other similar industries. 
(Gilbert et al. 2012, 224). 
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usually for overnight terms and must be fully secured by collateral. By tradition, not 
requirement, the 12 Reserve Banks complied with common collateral rules. It should be 
noted, however, as will be discussed later, for a number of reasons DW lending to banks has 
historically been fairly minimal.  
In addition, the Fed has the ability to make loans through its OMOs on an as-needed basis in 
order to offset other changes in its balance sheet and adjust the amount of reserves that it 
holds in order to maintain the federal funds rate around the target established by the Federal 
Open Market Committee (FOMC).8 This lending was usually in the form of overnight repo or 
reverse repo lending through its primary dealers against highly restricted classes of 
collateral that are limited by statute, specifically, U.S. Treasury and U.S. government agency 
securities, including mortgage-backed securities issued by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and 
Ginnie Mae. 
Collateral for Discount Window Loans  
All DW loans (and later loans under the TAF) were made with recourse to the borrower and 
also had to be “secured to the satisfaction of the Federal Reserve” bank making the loan and 
supported by “acceptable collateral.” Acceptable collateral included most performing loans 
and most investment-grade securities, although for some types of securities (including 
commercial mortgage-backed securities, collateralized debt obligations, collateralized loan 
obligations, and certain non-dollar-denominated foreign securities) only AAA-rated 
securities were accepted. Instruments that were issued by the borrower or its affiliates were 
not acceptable as collateral.  
Banks had to establish a borrowing relationship and deposit collateral with a Federal 
Reserve bank before they could execute a loan. Therefore, some banks would set up a 
relationship and deposit collateral just to ensure that they would be able to borrow from the 
Fed should the need arise. Assets accepted as collateral were assigned a “lendable value,” 
roughly fair market value less an applicable haircut. 9 Haircuts varied greatly based on the 
type of asset and its duration. Haircuts were lowest for high-quality assets of very short-term 
duration and greatest for low-quality assets of long-term duration. Haircuts applied only to 
assets for which there were market prices being quoted. For assets for which a market price 
could not readily be obtained, even AAA-rated assets (such as certain collateralized bonds 
during the crisis), an internally modeled fair market value estimate based on comparable 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
8 The discount rates and reserve requirements are proposed by the board of directors of the regional Reserve 
Banks and are approved by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The Federal Open Market 
Committee (FOMC) is responsible for open market operations and setting the federal funds rate.  
9 “Lendable value is determined as the market price of the asset less a haircut, or, when a market price is not 
available, an internally modeled fair market value estimate less a haircut. Haircuts reflect credit risk and, for 
traded assets, the historical volatility of the asset’s price and the liquidity or illiquidity of the market in which 
the asset is traded. The Federal Reserve’s haircuts are generally in line with typical market practice. The Federal 
Reserve applies larger haircuts—and thus assigns lower lendable values—to assets for which no market price 
is available than to comparable assets for which a market price is available. Borrowers may be required to 
pledge additional collateral if their financial condition weakens” (Fed. Res. website).  
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assets was assigned. And in the case of loans, the margin for assets with a term greater than 
ten years was applied10.  
3. Discount Window Lending During the Crisis 
On August 10, 2007, the day after BNP Paribas made its announcement, the Federal Reserve 
announced that it was available to provide liquidity “to facilitate the orderly functioning of 
financial markets” in light of the current circumstances where “depository institutions may 
experience unusual funding needs because of dislocations in money and credit markets.” At 
that time the Fed did not take any action to make its DW funding any more attractive. Its 
stance was one of reassurance. It had money to lend and banks could borrow at the then 
primary credit rate of 6.25% (Fed. Res. Aug. 10, 2007).  
However, one week later, on August 17, the Fed lowered its primary credit rate by 50 basis 
points to a rate of 5.75%. Significantly, this halved the traditional 100 basis point spread 
between the DW rate and the federal funds rate. Also, in response to a shortening of credit 
tenure in the market, the Fed changed the term of its DW lending from overnight to permit 
loans for up to 30 days. It further committed to maintain these liberal terms until it 
“determine[d] that market liquidity has improved materially” in order to “provide 
depositories with greater assurance about the cost and availability of funding” (Fed Res. Aug. 
17, 2008). 
A month later, on September 18, 2007, the Fed again made a 50-basis-point reduction in the 
primary credit rate. As shown in Figure 1, it would repeat this action and continue to reduce 
the rate aggressively over the next 90 days in an effort to stimulate the banks to borrow. By 
December 2007, the fed funds rate and primary credit rate were at 4.25% and 4.75%, 
respectively. A year later, in the midst of the worst financial upheaval since the Great 
Depression, the rates would stand at .25% and .50%, respectively. 
This aggressive campaign by the Fed was recognition of the brewing volatility in the credit 
markets as the subprime mortgage market corrected. As early as August 10, 2007, the credit 
markets began to react to increased concerns about counterparty risk and liquidity by 
demanding increased rates for funding, especially with respect to unsecured lending. The 
Fed’s actions were an attempt to ensure the banks and the investment community that the 
Fed would provide the liquidity needed. By assuring that the liquidity would be available, 
the Fed hoped to prevent the problems in the mortgage market from spilling over to other 
credit markets and ultimately impacting the greater economy.  
However, volatility continued. Soon, some ABCP issuers found it difficult to roll over their 
maturing paper (which sometimes incorporated subprime mortgages), and a run on ABCP 
ensued. The types of collateral that lenders would accept became more constrained as 
worries about structured securities increased. Banks, both foreign and domestic, which 
relied on securitization to manage loan inventory and fund future lending were faced with 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
10 For more details regarding the Fed’s DW loan collateral program, see The Federal Reserve System Guide to 
Discount Window Collateral, accompanying Collateral Margins Table, and Operating Circular No. 10. 
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having to take assets onto their balance sheets and also a retraction in their funding sources. 
They scrambled to fund these new assets and fill their funding gaps through a combination 
of unsecured CP, repos, and notably, U.S. banks financed mortgages through loans from the 
Federal Home Loan Bank System.11 These alternative sources enabled banks to moderate the 
effects of the market upheaval. However, there still was concern that to preserve their 
liquidity, banks in this situation might begin to tighten the credit that they made available to 
households and businesses, weakening in the economy (Fed. Res. Sept. 17, 2007).   
 
FIGURE 1: Changes to Federal Lending Rates—2007 to 2010  
Source: Federal Reserve 2008 Developments.  
The continued disruption in the credit markets compelled the Fed to seek ways to make the 
DW more effective. In December 2007, it introduced the Term Auction Facility (discussed 
below), a mechanism that would make DW funds available to banks through a market 
(auction) determined price for term loans every two weeks. The TAF would be aggressively 
utilized even as the DW was still shunned.  
Even so, on March 16, 2008, following the near collapse of Bear Stearns, and significant 
continued deterioration in the term funding markets, the Federal Reserve announced that it 
_____________________________________________________________________ 





Discount rate (change) 
Fed funds target rate/range 
(change) 
Jan - July, 2007 6.25% 5.25% 
August 17, 2007 5.75% (−50 bp) 5.25% (no change) 
September 18, 2007 5.25% (−50 bp) 4.75% (−50 bp) 
October 31, 2007 5.00% (−25 bp) 4.50% (−25 bp) 
December 11, 2007 4.75% (−25 bp) 4.25% (−25 bp) 
January 22, 2008 4.00% (−75 bp) 3.50% (−75 bp) 
January 30, 2008 3.50% (−50 bp) 3.00% (−50 bp) 
March 16, 2008 3.25% (−25 bp) 3.00% (no change) 
March 18, 2008 2.50% (−75 bp) 2.25% (−75 bp) 
April 30, 2008 2.25% (−25 bp) 2.00% (−25 bp) 
October 8, 2008 1.75% (−50 bp) 1.50% (−50 bp) 
October 29, 2008 1.25% (−50 bp) 1.00% (−50 bp) 
December 16, 2008 0.50% (−75 bp) 0–0.25% (−75 bp) 
January 16, 2009 0.50% (no change) 0-0.25% (no change) 
February 18, 2010 0.75% (+25bp) 0−0.25% (no change) 
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was reducing the spread for DW lending over the federal funds rate to 25 basis points, (to 
3.25% and 3.00% respectively) (Fed. Bd of Gov. March 16, 2008). This was quickly followed 
by a further 75-basis-point reduction in both the federal funds rate (to 2.25%) and the DW 
rate (down to 2.5%) (Fed Bd of Gov., March 18, 2008). The Fed also increased the maximum 
maturity for DW loans to 90 days.  
Although at this time, the TAF had supplanted the DW as the main source of government 
funding utilized by banks in need (See Figure 2.), these actions by the Fed in lowering the 
discount rate recognized that the already stressed market might yet be overtaxed by the 
effects of Bear Stearns. It was also recognition of the sudden nature of Bear’s demise.12 A 
rash of investors refusing to roll over funding could similarly cause an otherwise solvent 
bank to experience a severe hole in its funding. The TAF provided for periodic auctions, but 
only the DW could be accessed by any bank on any day for an immediate injection of funds 
to squelch a sudden liquidity need.  
At no prior time in the Fed’s history had it so aggressively reduced the borrowing rates. The 
federal funds rate was reduced ten times between August 2007 and December 2008, 
dropping by five points (from 5.25% to .25%), and the spread between that rate and the DW 
primary credit rate dropped from 1 percent to 25 basis points. As shown in Figure 2, 
however, the Fed’s aggressive lowering of the borrowing rates had little success in 
persuading banks to borrow directly from the DW, especially prior to September 2008. (See 
discussion at page 15.)  
Administrative details regarding the Fed’s DW lending may be found at the following 
webpages: https://www.frbdiscountwindow.org/ (Federal Reserve) and 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/banking/discountwindow.html (Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York). 
4. The Problem of Stigma 
Despite the availability of the Federal Reserve to provide funding as LOLR through the DW, 
there were several reasons why eligible banks were often reluctant to access these funds, 
even in the midst of the financial crisis. The fact that reserves didn’t pay interest had a 
notably distorting influence on bank reserves management by banks, including their use (or 
lack thereof) of the DW. The Fed set very low, often zero, reserve requirements on deposits.  
Most reserve requirements were met by banks holding “vault cash,” i.e., cash in their ATMs, 
not through their deposits at the Fed. As a result, depository institutions’ deposits/reserves 
at the Fed were small. Of course, when overnight rates were positive, the banks didn’t want 
to hold any reserves⎯required or excess ⎯because reserves didn’t pay interest. Instead 
they could loan funds out and earn interest. Banks employed many mechanisms to keep 
required reserves low and excess reserves near zero. The tiny size of (non-currency) 
reserves, meant that when a bank was accidentally “short” of reserves at the end of the day, 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
12 Bear, an investment bank, followed a highly-leveraged business model like most of its peers and financed a 
substantial portion of its balance sheet with short-term lending (and by March 2008, even overnight repo). 
When lenders refused to roll over its debt, it had no LOLR to turn to. 
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the size of their miss was typically small as well. Therefore, the cost of paying a very high 
market interest rate to borrow reserves for one day in the Fed funds market (at a rate above 
the discount rate) was “small change,” and doing so was more convenient than accessing the 
DW.  
 However, the most significant reason that banks refused to access the DW was fear that 
doing so would signal that they had unusual funding needs and or that they could not raise 
funds in the market. To access the DW, the bank had to initiate the transaction and it might 
have been the only entity borrowing from the DW at the time. Although, prior to the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Pub. L. 111-203, H.R. 4173) the Fed 
did not publicly disclose the names of banks that borrowed from the window, there were 
nevertheless incidents when this information was released by the media and perceived 
negatively (Armantier et al., 2013, 2-3). Further, the Fed did report DW lending in its weekly 
H4.1 report, which, although it did not identify borrowers, did identify borrowing by region, 
which could lead to troubling and or harmful speculation.13 
The issue of stigma and DW lending has a long history due to changes in the Fed’s policies 
and practices over time. Established by the Federal Reserve Act of 1913, the Fed’s DW was 
intended to provide a mechanism for the Fed to operate as the LOLR, anticipating and 
preventing bank runs by providing needed liquidity rather than merely lending into the run 
(Gorton and Metrick 2013, 6). In its early years, the DW lending rates were below market, 
and the new regime was successful in preventing runs of eligible national banks throughout 
the 1920s as banks freely borrowed from the DW. However, the Fed soon became concerned 
that some banks were borrowing too freely and or borrowing to speculate in the securities 
markets. 
The Fed began to discourage DW borrowing and throughout the decade it quietly shifted its 
monetary policy to pressuring bank reserves through open market operations, while 
encouraging banks to be “reluctant to borrow” from the DW. The Fed promoted DW 
borrowing for temporary periods and unusual circumstances, rather than continuous 
borrowing for ordinary needs. In light of these new parameters, banks that did borrow were 
looked upon as weak, suffering a stigma (Ibid., 9-12). And so, as banks began to experience 
troubles during the Great Depression, they refused to borrow from the DW. Depositors 
panicked and sought to withdraw their funds. Many banks were unable to meet their 
obligations and failed. Bank runs broadened as depositors realized that despite the Fed’s role 
as LOLR, their banks couldn’t pay them.  
The Fed’s “reluctance to borrow” policy persisted and over time became formalized in rules 
that required banks seeking to borrow to exhaust other sources of lending before borrowing 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
13 The H4.1 report provides borrowing by Fed district. Many felt it increased the DW stigma, because any 
disclosure of DW lending led to speculation about which bank, particularly which large bank, in a region was 
doing the borrowing. For example, if the 12th district (San Francisco Fed) reported any sizable DW borrowing 
for the week, market participants would immediately begin to speculate which large California bank (e.g. Wells, 
Fargo) was “in trouble” with the expected consequences. In this way borrowing from the DW could be 
particularly stigmatizing for the big banks.  
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at the DW, and to explain their need for the funds. The introduction of federal depository 
insurance after the Depression mitigated the effects of this policy, since even if the banks 
didn’t borrow, depositors would be protected (Ibid.).  
In 2003, the Fed finally changed course and created a “no ask” policy removing the need for 
banks to prove that they had exhausted other sources of borrowing or to explain why they 
were borrowing (Armantier et al., 2013, 7). Its new program, which also introduced the 
three-tier borrowing levels, was intended to “reduce institutions’ reluctance to use the 
window as a source of back-up, short-term liquidity” (Fed. Res. Bd. Gov. 2003). 
Simultaneously, the primary credit rate was raised above the Federal funds rate. As a result, 
a bank could borrow from the DW for any reason, not just because it could not access other 
funding, but at a premium rate (Ibid.).  
However, few banks did borrow. Despite the 2003 changes, banks continued to fear that they 
would be perceived as being troubled if they sought funding from the DW. The consequences 
of stigma could be severe for any bank and might include: sparking a run on deposits, a loss 
of confidence by analysts, a drop in the bank’s stock price, or withdrawal of market sources 
of liquidity (Ibid., 1). Given these risks (which could be particularly dire for an institution 
experiencing real financial weakness), many banks decided that borrowing funds from the 
DW was too risky. However, failing to access the DW could also weaken a bank’s situation by 
compelling it to borrow at higher rates or conduct sales of assets at fire-sale prices to meet 
liquidity needs. Further, banks’ reluctance to borrow from the DW limited the Fed’s ability 
to inject liquidity into the economy and thus fulfill its primary mission as overseer of 
monetary policy (Ibid., 7). (Also see Di Leo and Randall (2011) for further discussion of the 
stigma phenomenon.) 
The Impact of Stigma during the Crisis 
It is clear from the FOMC meeting transcripts that the Fed understood that this stigma 
continued to affect DW borrowing when the credit markets became disturbed in late 2007:  
The second issue that we have been looking at is how to address the stigma of the 
discount window. Are there ways to provide liquidity that would help normalize 
money markets, particularly term money markets, and would allow banks to make 
use of the enormous amount of collateral they have at the discount window, but 
would avoid the stigma and create a more efficient system? The solution that the staff 
came up with on that was to have an auction facility that would essentially set an 
endogenous price and, because it was an auction, it might look more like a good 
business proposition rather than like a move of desperation and, therefore, would not 
have the same stigma. (FOMC Trans. Sept. 18, 2007, 128) 
This continued to be the Fed’s viewpoint at its December 2007 meeting where it finally 
adopted the TAF. In so doing, it also noted the different environments faced by the central 
banks in Europe and the United Kingdom:  
The term funding spreads in the euro area are a bit narrower than those in the United 
States and the United Kingdom. This may reflect, in part, the term funding operations 
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of the European Central Bank. The ECB monetary policy framework permits the ECB 
to provide a large amount of term funds to many different depository institutions that 
are secured by a broad range of collateral. In addition, little stigma appears to be 
associated with the use of the ECB’s standing facility, in contrast to the United 
Kingdom and the United States, where stigma plays a much more important role in 
limiting borrowing from such facilities. (FOMC Trans. Dec. 6, 2007, 3-4) 
This sentiment regarding stigma was also later confirmed by Chairman Bernanke: 
In August 2007…banks were reluctant to rely on discount window credit to address 
their funding needs. The banks’ concern was their recourse to the discount window, 
if it became known, might lead market participants to infer weakness—the so-called 
stigma problem. (Bernanke 2009) 
As noted earlier, DW borrowing was limited even as the Fed continuously and aggressively 
lowered the primary credit rate. Armantier, Krieger, and McAndrews (2008) argue that this 
could have been because there was other well-priced market funding available, especially 
because the market’s most severe strains were with respect to term funding not (yet) 
overnight funding. However, one must consider this possible explanation in light of the 
immediate and aggressive use of the TAF after implementation, as shown in Figure 2, and as 
discussed below.14  
Figure 2: Amount of Discount Window Primary Credit and TAF Loans 
Outstanding 
 
Source: Gilbert et al. 2012.  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
14 In a later paper, Armantier, et al. (2013) show that stigma was evidenced by banks’ utilization of the TAF 
rather than the DW, and by their willingness to pay a premium to borrow from the TAF over the DW. Also see 
discussion at page 7. 
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5. The Term Auction Facility  
The Term Auction Facility (TAF) was announced on December 12, 2007, and, as shown by 
the FOMC meeting transcripts, was specifically created to address perceptions of stigma that 
prevented banks from accessing the DW by requiring banks to step up to participate in the 
auctions en masse on a given day rather than to self-initiate the borrowing process15 
(Armantier et al. 2013, 10).  
The TAF was the result of many months of deliberate study and intense work by the staffs of 
the Federal Reserve Board and the Reserve Bank of New York,16 which, beginning in August 
2007, were tasked with how to make the DW more effective. The Fed Board and FOMC first 
considered a proposal for a TAF-like facility at their September 18, 2007, joint meeting but 
delayed implementation since market conditions had improved somewhat. The facility was 
later reconsidered and the TAF approved in December as conditions in the interbank lending 
markets continued to deteriorate, pressuring the banks.17 
Other options considered in lieu of the TAF were (1) a temporary reduction in the spread 
between the primary credit rate and the target federal funds rate18 and (2) the adoption of a 
term credit program, under which term credit could be extended, potentially at a lower rate 
than the primary credit rate, at a borrower’s initiative (FOMC Trans. Dec. 6, 2007, 5). 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
15 The following answer was given in response to the question of how the facility addresses the stigma issue: 
“MR. MADIGAN: Well, partly by auctioning credit, so institutions are coming to the Federal Reserve voluntarily 
and paying a price that is market based. Another point is that the institutions are regarded as generally sound. 
They have to meet a certain qualification standard to get to the discount window, and we would be taking 
certain steps in terms of our reports to try to distinguish this from other discount window credit. Now, that 
said, I think we have to admit that we’re not sure the degree to which this would deal with the stigma issue. 
MR. FISHER. I mean, aren’t they still saying that they are distressed?  
MR. DUDLEY. No. No, the economics are better because you have to think about the minimum rate. The 
minimum rate is the swap rate plus 10 basis points, which is well below one-month LIBOR and well below the 
one-month term fed funds rate. So, there is that room in-between. You could actually criticize a bank for not 
participating in this. They are somehow leaving money on the table by not taking advantage of this” (FOMC 
Trans. Sept. 18, 2007, 140). 
16 FOMC Trans. Sept. 18, 2007, 131. 
17 “In addition, participants noted that some intermediaries were facing balance-sheet pressures and could 
become constrained by concerns about rating-agency or regulatory capital requirements. Among other factors, 
banks were experiencing unanticipated growth in loans as a result of continuing illiquidity in the market for 
leveraged loans, persisting problems in the commercial paper market that had sparked draws on back-up lines 
of credit, and, more recently, consolidation of assets of off-balance-sheet affiliates onto banks’ balance sheets.   
. . . Concerns about credit risk and the pressures on banks’ balance-sheet capacity appeared to be contributing 
to diminished liquidity in interbank markets and to pronounced widening in term spreads for periods 
extending through year-end” (FOMC Mins Dec. 11, 2007, 6).  
18 The Fed did do this on March 16, 2008, when it narrowed the spread between the primary credit rate and 
the federal funds rate to only 25 basis points. It also lengthened the permitted maturity to up to 90 days 
(Armantier et al. 2011, 10). These changes did result in higher borrowings from the DW. (See Figures 1 and 2.)   
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However, the TAF was selected in part because it had several advantages relative to the other 
two options.  
First, it allowed the Federal Reserve to control when liquidity was released into the market 
and to retain close control over the supply of reserves because auction size would determine 
the auction amounts—at least assuming that the minimum bid rate was not binding. Second, 
the facility arguably had a better chance of avoiding stigma, because the auction format 
required all banks to bid at the same time, so there is no “first mover” disadvantage. In 
addition, the auction implied that no institution was being forced to borrow. Third, each 
auction revealed information about the strength of the demand for funds. Finally, a TAF could 
also have potential longer-run benefits for managing reserves and conducting monetary 
policy both in routine circumstances and in circumstances of financial stress (Ibid., 6-7). 
In adopting the TAF, the Fed was also addressing the broader U.S. dollar funding issue and 
in connection therewith approved the first U.S. dollar swaps with the European Central Bank 
(ECB) and the Swiss National Bank (FOMC Mins. Dec. 11, 2007, 6). Prior to September 2008, 
the U.S. dollar swaps were very closely connected to the TAF auctions but were disconnected 
thereafter as the central banks executed more control over their auctions given the 
tremendous market upheaval that had to be dealt with. (See Wiggins and Metrick 2016C for 
consideration of the U.S. dollar swaps program.) 
Figure 3: Comparison Between the Discount Window and the Term Auction Lending 
Facilities 
 Discount Window (Primary 
Credit) 
Term Auction Facility (TAF) 
Similarities   
Collateral and 
haircut 
Same collateral and haircut 
calculations as TAF for 28-day 
loans 
Same collateral and haircut 
calculations as TAF for 28-day 
loans 
eligibility All banks with reserve account 
and high supervisory rating 
Primary credit eligible banks 
with enough collateral to make 
the minimum TAF bid  
Minimum bid or 
loan amount 
None $10 million until February 1, 
2008,  
$5 Million after that 
identification  Identities of DW borrowers 
were not revealed until 
December 23, 2011 
Identities of TAF participant were 
not revealed until December 1, 
2010 
Differences   
Frequency Any time during normal 
business hours 
Generally, once every two weeks 
Loan Term Overnight through 30 days 
before March 16, 2008, and 90 
days thereafter as determined 
Generally, 28 or 84 days as 
determined by the Fed 
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Source: Armantier et al. 2013. 
Design Features of the TAF 
As shown in Figure 3, the TAF operationally utilized many of the same administrative 
mechanisms of the DW since it was in essence an auction of DW loans. Participating banks 
were required to have in place their respective Federal Reserve Bank standard borrowing 
agreements and collateral, just as with DW lending; similar agreements were utilized. The 
same collateral standards and haircuts were also applied. The Fed changed the pricing 
mechanism of DW lending and by so doing succeeded in repackaging an unsuccessful lending 
program into one that was highly utilized. (See FOMC Trans. Sept. 18, 2007, 131-33 for a 
detailed description of the operational aspects of the TAF.) 
Eligibility 
Any bank that was solvent and met the Fed’s standards of eligibility for the DW primary 
credit rate, and which had adequate collateral could participate. A higher standard—“well 
capitalized and well managed⎯the financial holding company type standards” had been 
discussed but was abandoned for fear that it might lead to administrative complication and 
perception problems.19  
It was also considered that large banks that were troubled might participate and co-opt the 
funding giving the impression that the facility was aimed at specific large institutions⎯ that 
it was a “big institutional facility”⎯ rather than a solution aimed at the broad market (Ibid., 
135-40). These concerns were addressed in part by a reduction in the maximum bid from 
20% of the allotted funds to 10%, ensuring that at every auction at least 10 banks would 
participate.  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
19 There was concern that if a higher standard were imposed, it might disqualify some banks that met the 
standard for the primary credit rate and send a signal that the Fed thought those banks were weak (FOMC Sept. 
18, 2007, 141). 
by the borrower; renewable by 
borrower 
Maximum bid or 
loan amount 
Up to available collateral 10% of auction size or up to 
available collateral (whichever is 
smaller) 
prepayment Allowed without penalty Not allowed 
rate Spread over fed funds target 
rate (target+50 bp until March 
16, 2008; target +25 bp 
thereafter) 
Determined through competitive 
bidding at an auction  
Settlement Credited on the same day Credited to the winning bidders 
three days after the auction  
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Another design change was a reduction in the minimum amount that could be bid to $10 
million, lowered from an original proposed $50 million in order to make the facility more 
accessible to smaller institutions (FOMC Trans. Dec. 6, 2007, 8). Additionally, beginning on 
February 1, 2008, the minimum bid was further reduced to $5 million in order to “facilitate 
participation by smaller institutions” (Fed. Res. Feb. 1, 2008). (See footnote 23 for how 
amounts were allocated to bidders.) 
With respect to the issue of whether failing banks took advantage of the TAF, Gilbert et al. 
(2012) concluded that during the crisis only 53 banks borrowed from the Fed (DW and TAF) 
while undercapitalized and for only short periods, and well within the Federal limits.20 They 
found that over 90% of the banks that became undercapitalized during the crisis did not 
borrow from the Fed while undercapitalized (Gilbert et al. 2012, 232).  
Foreign Banks  
U.S. branches of foreign banks were consolidated and treated as a single bidder for purposes 
of the TAF limits. And it was debated whether to permit “double dipping,” in essence allowing 
the U.S. subsidiaries of foreign banks to borrow from the TAF while their foreign parents 
could borrow U.S. dollars from their home central banks under the swap agreements. 
Ultimately it was recognized that this duality was consistent with the Fed’s monetary policy 
role, promoted the maintenance of the interconnected global dollar markets, and that U.S. 
banks had a similar dual ability (FOMC Trans. Sept. 18, 2007, 133-39). In practice, U.S. 
subsidiaries of foreign banks were some of the most frequent and heaviest borrowers under 
the TAF as shown in Figures 4 and 5. The Fed was criticized for this when the information 
was later revealed.21 (See also Yang et al. [2010], Keoun [2011], and Appendices C and D.) 
Collateral  
TAF loans were fully collateralized and applied DW collateral standards and haircuts. (See 
discussion at page 4.) For any auction, a bank’s bid and award could also be limited so that 
all outstanding DW and TAF loans would not exceed 50% of its pledged collateral, a 
reduction from an initially proposed 80% limit (FOMC Trans. Dec. 6, 2007, 8).  
It should also be noted that use of the TAF by foreign banks was extensive. Slightly more than 
58% of TAF funds were borrowed by foreign banks which pledged a larger portion of asset-
backed securities and residential mortgages than did U.S. banks (Benmelech 2012, 27). U.S. 
banks on the other hand, pledged more whole loan collateral such as commercial real estate 
loans, private label MBS and CDOs. Nevertheless, the majority of collateral pledged by U.S. 
and foreign banks was highly opaque, hard to value, and increasingly illiquid.  
  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
20 Changes in the law adopted in 1991, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA), 
after the savings and loan crisis limited the amounts that the Federal Reserve could loan to distressed banks.  
21 The Fed did not publish the results of the TAF auctions until two years later, to militate against stigma.  
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Figure 4: Most Frequent Term Auction Facility Borrowers*  
 
Figure 5: Top 5 TAF Borrowers, in Billions 
Source: Federal Reserve and GAO; Note: Also see Appendix C. 
Rates  
Rates for loans under TAF were established to make the facility attractive. Prior to January 
12, 2009, the minimum bid rate was based on a measure of the average expected overnight 
fed funds rate over the term of the credit being auctioned. From January 12, 2009, to the 
conclusion of the program, the minimum bid rate was set equal to the rate that Reserve 







Mitsubishi UFJ Trust and Banking 
Corp. 
55 0.4                                           1.2 
Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corp. 49 1.2 2.8 
Mizuho Corporate Bank Ltd. 47 1.1 3.5 
Arab Banking Corp. 46 0.6 1.4 
Bayerische Hypo and Vereins 
Bank 
43 0.8 2.2 
Bank of Scotland PLC 40 4.5 9.0 
DZ Bank AG Deutsche Zentral 38 1.0 3.0 
Barclays Bank PLC 37 5.1 15.0 
Bayerische Landesbank 37 2.9 7.0 
Dresdner Bank AG 37 3.3 7.5 
All 416 program borrowers 4,214 0.9 15.0 
*New York branches were borrowing entities for all 10 institutions listed. Average and 
maximum amounts borrowed by institutions are per operation and in billions of dollars. 
Maximum amounts borrowed by institutions at a given time can and do exceed the per-
operation maximum because of overlapping borrowing periods for the various operations.  
Source: Fleming 2012.  
Parent Company  Total TAF Loans Percent of Total 
Bank of America Corporation $260 7.3% 
Barclays PLC (United Kingdom) 232 6.1 
Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC 
(United Kingdom) 
212 5.5 










Banks paid on excess reserve balances so as to prevent arbitrage. Bidders had to bid above 
the minimum rate. Loan rates were set through the auction process with one rate (the stop-
out rate) being applied to all funds lent at that auction. The stop-out rate is the lowest 
accepted bid rate.22 
Also see TAF Terms and Conditions and TAF Frequently Asked Questions for additional 
operational details regarding the TAF. Other detailed historical materials and transaction 
data are available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/taf.htm. 
6. Use and Impact of the Discount Window and TAF 
A few banks utilized the Discount Window, mostly smaller ones and the U.S. subsidiaries of 
foreign institutions. Primary credit loans remained near zero until March 2008, when the 
interbank funding markets became even more strained in the turmoil around Bear Stearns, 
and when the spread between the prime credit rate and the Federal funds rate was lowered 
to 25 basis points. At that time, borrowing activity increased and Discount Window loans 
peaked in late 2008 at a maximum amount outstanding of approximately $100 billion. 
Without doubt, however, TAF loans accounted for the overwhelming majority of liquidity 
assistance to depository institutions during the crisis. 
Extensive Usage of TAF 
The TAF was an “immediate success in terms of amounts borrowed” and “seems to have been 
designed effectively to remove stigma concerns” (Armantier et al. 2011, 4, 15). Evidence of 
utilization of the TAF is evidence of the market’s need for it—it would become one of the 
largest liquidity programs instituted by the Fed, second only behind the amounts funded 
thorough the central bank liquidity swaps that maintained the flow of U.S. dollars around the 
world and which were originally coordinated with the TAF auctions. (See Wiggins and 
Metrick 2015C.) It should also be noted that use of the TAF by foreign banks was extensive. 
Slightly more than 58% of TAF funds were borrowed by foreign banks (Benmelech 2012, 
27). 
Approximately 60 TAF auctions were held every two weeks between December 2007 and 
March 2010, when the TAF was terminated. For each auction the Fed would specify an 
amount of funds that was available, usually varying between $20 billion to as high as $150 
billion at the peak of the crisis in October 2008. The loans were for 28-day terms initially, 
and after August 11, 2008, were for 84 days. Beginning with the auction held on October 6, 
2008, the Fed significantly increased the offer amount for 84-day maturities and for the first 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
22 The process for determining the TAF auction allocation and the stop-out rate was as follows: Bids were 
ordered from the highest to the lowest rate. Bids were then accepted starting with the highest rate submitted, 
down to successively lower rates, until the Offering Amount of the auction had been allocated or until the 
Minimum Bid Rate was reached (whichever occurred first). The lowest accepted interest rate was the “stop-
out rate.” Bids at interest rates above the stop-out rate were allocated the full amount of TAF Advance bid for. 
Bids at the stop-out rate were subject to being prorated if allocating the full amount requested would cause the 
total amount allocated in the auction to exceed the Offering Amount (TAF Frequently Asked Questions). 
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time provided full allotments to all bidders, lending the full amounts bid at the minimum bid 
stop-out price.  
This action by the Fed was similar to actions taken by the ECB at this time to provide 
increased U.S. dollar liquidity to its banks. Unlike the ECB, however, the Fed did not announce 
or commit to providing full allotments. Instead, it just increased the auction offer amount to 
$150 billion, for each monthly auction of one-month loans, and for all three monthly auctions 
of three-month loans, bringing total potential credit available to $600 billion. This amount 
was greater than the oversubscribed total bids that it had been recently receiving. As 
discussed below, with the increase in the size of the auction, the stop-out rate for the first 
time equaled the minimum bid rate, whereas previously in the oversubscribed auctions the 
stop-out rate had exceeded the minimum rate. Thus, bidders were more likely to receive the 
maximum amount of funds that they requested at a lower cost. (See Appendices A and B, for 
examples of TAF auction announcements and settlements.) 
Figure 6: Size of TAF Auctions  
 
Source: Benmelech 2012, 17. 
During its tenure the Fed would lend a total of $3.8 trillion to 416 banks pursuant to 4,214 
TAF loans (Gilbert et al. 2012, 224) (Felkerson 2011, 7). Peak monthly borrowing occurred 
in January 2009 at $347 billion and the peak amount outstanding of $493 billion occurred 
on March 2, 2009 (Felkerson 2011, 8-9). Of the 416 unique participants, 92 percent 
borrowed more than $10 billion. The top 25 banks, all of which borrowed in excess of $47 
billion, comprised 72 percent of total TAF borrowing (Ibid.). Fleming (2011) found such 
widespread usage to be consistent with the Federal Reserve’s role as LOLR.  
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It is interesting to note that 19 of the 25 largest borrowers were headquartered in foreign 
countries. Of the $2.8 trillion borrowed by the largest 25 participants, 69 percent ($1.9 
trillion) was borrowed by foreign institutions. (See Appendices C and D for more detail 
regarding borrowings by individual institutions.) 
Auction Premium 
Further evidence of the TAF’s effectiveness is that banks were willing to pay a premium to 
borrow from the TAF. The stop-out rate for a TAF auction could be higher or lower than the 
DW lending rate, depending on the bids submitted. If the stop-out rate was determined to be 
higher than the primary credit rate, for example, the overall cost of $50 billion in loans under 
TAF could cost more than the same loans under the DW. And, as shown in Figure 4, for 
periods during 2008, prior to the changes made in October, funding under the TAF was 
consistently more expensive than at the DW (Armantier 2013, 27).  
For example, for the auction conducted on September 22, 2008, when the DW rate was 
2.25%, the minimum bid was a rate of 1.949% and the stop-out rate was 3.75%. The amount 
bid was $134 billion, and the amount awarded was the preannounced $75 billion, leaving 
many bids unfulfilled (Appendix A), illustrative of the fact that at that time the TAF auctions 
were consistently oversubscribed. Once the offering amounts were expanded, in essence to 
provide full allotment (the maximum was raised to historical bid levels), the stop-out rates 
dropped to the minimum bid rate, which were lower than the DW rate. This was the case 
with the October 6, 2008, auction, when the DW rate was then 2.25%. The minimum bid rate 
and the stop-out rate were the same (1.39%) as were the amount bid and the amount allotted 
($138.0921 billion) (Appendix B).   
Select Research Findings  
Armantier, et al. (2013) found that participating banks bid for TAF loans at prices greater 
than the primary credit rate approximately half the time. (See Figure 7.) As a result, there 
was a higher cost of $300 million, $6.56 million per auction for each participating bank, on 
average, to borrow under the TAF than to borrow the amount under the window. They 
attribute the banks’ willingness to pay this premium to the DW stigma. The spread between 
the DW and the TAF was greatest during the fall after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers 
(prior to the expansion of the auction amounts), when the aggregate per-auction premium 
over DW reached $2.5 billion. The authors see this premium as “conclusive evidence of DW 
stigma” during the crisis (Ibid., 23).   
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Figure 7: TAF Bids Above the DW Rate and Frequency Distribution  
 
Note: The figure above shows the share of banks that submit a TAF bid above the DW rate. 
If a bank submits two bids, only the bid with the highest rate is considered. Auctions with 
a stop-out rate above the DW rate are indicated by solid circles, while auctions with a stop-
out rate below the DW rate have hollow circles. The reduction in the DW penalty from 50 
to 25 basis points on March 16, 2008, is indicated by the first vertical line, and the date of 
the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, September 15, 2008, by the second vertical line.  
Source: Armantier 2013. 
In their paper regarding the effectiveness of the TAF, McAndrews, Sarkar, and Wang (2008) 
found that the facility had the effect of lowering the three-month LIBOR–OIS spread on the 
dates of announcement of TAF auctions and on the actual settlement dates. Wu (2011) found 
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similar results and that the differences occurring were between 50 and 70 basis points 
lower.23  
Wind Down 
As the credit markets improved and as the cost of market funding declined, utilization of the 
TAF decreased, as had been planned. On September 24, 2009, the Fed announced that it 
would scale back the TAF, and the auction amounts were reduced for both the 24-day and 
84-day terms. The last TAF auction was held on March 8, 2010, maturing on April 8, 2010. 
All TAF loans were repaid in full, with interest, and the facility expired in March 2010. 
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Appendix A: TAF Auction Announcement - September 22, 2008 
 
Release Date: September 22, 2008  
For release at 10:00 a.m. EDT  
 
On September 22, 2008, the Federal Reserve will offer $75 billion in 28-day credit through 
its Term Auction Facility. Additional information regarding the auction is listed below; the 
auction will be conducted as specified in this announcement, Regulation A, and the terms 
and conditions of the Term Auction Facility 
(www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/taf.htm).  
 
Note: Some key deadlines have changed for this TAF auction. Please review the 
following parameters. For a list of key times to be used in upcoming auctions, see 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/tafdates20080811.htm  
 
Description of Offering and Auction Parameters 
Offering Amount:  $75 billion 
Term:  28-day loan 
Bid Submission Date:  September 22, 2008 
 Opening Time:  11:00 a.m. EDT 
 Closing Time:  12:30 p.m. EDT 
Notification Date:  September 23, 2008 
Settlement Date:  September 25, 2008 
Maturity Date:  October 23, 2008 
Minimum Bid Amount (per bid):  $5 million 
Bid Increment:  $100,000 
Maximum Bid Amount (per institution):  $7.5 billion (10% of Offering Amount) 
Minimum Bid Rate:  1.94 percent 
Incremental Bid Rate:  0.001 percent 
Minimum Award:  $10,000 
Maximum Award:  $7.5 billion (10% of Offering Amount) 
 
Submission of Bids 
Participants must submit bids by phone to their local Reserve Bank between the opening 
time and closing time on the bid submission date. 
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Summary auction results will be published on the website of the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System (www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/taf.htm) at 
approximately 10:00 a.m. EDT on the notification date. Between 10:00 a.m. and 11:30 
a.m. EDT on the notification date, Reserve Banks will notify individual institutions in their 
districts that have submitted winning bids of their awards. Participants have until 12:30 
p.m. EDT on the notification date to inform their local Reserve Bank of any error.  
 
Rounding Convention 
Pro rata awards will be rounded to multiples of $10,000. Normal rounding convention will 
be used, except that awards under $10,000 will be rounded to $10,000. 
 
Source: Federal Reserve Website. 
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Appendix A-1: TAF Auction Results—September 23, 2008 
 
Release Date: September 23, 2008  
For release at 10:00 a.m. EDT  
 
On September 22, 2008, the Federal Reserve conducted an auction of $75 billion in 28 
-day credit through its Term Auction Facility. Following are the results of the auction:  
 
Stop-out rate: 3.750 percent 
      
Total propositions submitted: $133.562 billion 
Total propositions accepted: $ 75.000 billion 
Bid/cover ratio: 1.78 
      
Number of bidders: 85 
 
Bids at the stop-out rate were prorated at 58.10% and resulting awards were rounded to 
the nearest $10,000 (except that all awards below $10,000 are rounded up to $10,000). 
 
The awarded loans will settle on September 25, 2008, and will mature on October 23, 
2008. The stop-out rate shown above will apply to all awarded loans. 
 
Institutions that submitted winning bids will be contacted by their respective Reserve 
Banks by 11:30 a.m. EDT on September 23, 2008. Participants have until 12:30 p.m. EDT 
on September 23, 2008, to inform their local Reserve Bank of any error. 
 
Source: Federal Reserve Website. 
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Appendix B: TAF Auction Announcement—October 6, 2008 
 
Release Date: October 6, 2008  
For immediate release  
 
On October 6, 2008, the Federal Reserve will offer $150 billion in 85-day credit through its 
Term Auction Facility. Additional information regarding the auction is listed below; the  
auction will be conducted as specified in this announcement, Regulation A, and the terms 
and conditions of the Term Auction Facility 
(www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/taf.htm).  
 
Description of Offering and Auction Parameters 
 
Offering Amount:  $150 billion 
Term:  85-day loan 
Bid Submission Date:  October 6, 2008 
 Opening Time:  11:00 a.m. EDT 
 Closing Time:  12:30 p.m. EDT 
Notification Date:  October 7, 2008 
Settlement Date:  October 9, 2008 
Maturity Date:  January 2, 2009 
Minimum Bid Amount (per 
bid): 
 $5 million 
Bid Increment:  $100,000 
Maximum Bid Amount (per 
institution): 
 $15 billion (10% of Offering 
Amount) 
Minimum Bid Rate:  1.39 percent 
Incremental Bid Rate:  0.001 percent 
Minimum Award:  $10,000 
Maximum Award: 
 $15 billion (10% of Offering 
Amount) 
 
Submission of Bids 
Participants must submit bids by phone to their local Reserve Bank between the opening 
time and closing time on the bid submission date.  
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Summary auction results will be published on the website of the Board of Governors of the  
Federal Reserve System (www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/taf.htm) at  
approximately 10:00 a.m. EDT on the notification date. Between 10:00 a.m. and 11:30 
a.m. EDT on the notification date, Reserve Banks will notify individual institutions in their 
districts that have submitted winning bids of their awards. Participants have until 12:30 
p.m. EDT on the notification date to inform their local Reserve Bank of any error.  
 
Rounding Convention 
Pro rata awards will be rounded to multiples of $10,000. Normal rounding convention will 
be used, except that awards under $10,000 will be rounded to $10,000. 
 
 
Source: Federal Reserve Website. 
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Appendix B-1: TAF Auction Results—October 7, 2008 
 
Release Date: October 7, 2008  
For release at 10:00 a.m. EDT  
 
On October 6, 2008, the Federal Reserve conducted an auction of $150 billion in 85-day credit 
through its Term Auction Facility. Following are the results of the auction:  
Stop-out rate: 1.390 percent 
      
Total propositions submitted: $138.092 billion 
Total propositions accepted: $138.092 billion 
Bid/cover ratio: 0.92 
      
Number of bidders: 71 
 
The awarded loans will settle on October 9, 2008, and will mature on January 2, 2009. The 
stop-out rate shown above will apply to all awarded loans. 
 
Institutions that submitted winning bids will be contacted by their respective Reserve Banks 
by 
11:30 a.m. EDT on October 7, 2008. Participants have until 12:30 p.m. EDT on October 7, 2008, 
to inform their local Reserve Bank of any error. 
 








Appendix C: Largest TAF Borrowers 
 
 
Source: Benmelech 2012. 
  
62





















1 Barclays $232,283 $4,740.5 49 UK 
2 Bank of American $212,617 $14,144.5 15 U.S. 
3 Royal Bank of 
Scotland 
$180,920 $4,523.0 40 UK 
4 Wells Fargo $153,953 $8,102.9 19 U.S. 
5 Wachovia $147,025 $6,392.4 23 U.S. 
6 Société Générale $124,377 $4,442.0 28 France 
7 Dresdner Bank $123,328 $3,333.2 37 Germany 
8 RBS Citizens $117,510 $4,039.7 29 U.S. 
9 Citibank $110,350 $4,244.2 26 U.S. 
10 Bayerische 
Landesbank 
$108,190 $2,924.1 37 Germany 
11 Dexia $105,167 $4,382.0 24 Belgium 
12 Norinchukin Bank $105,010 $3,281.6 32 Japan 
13 JP Morgan Chase $98,782 $4,939.1 20 U.S. 
14 WestLB $78,406 $2,178.0 36 UK 
15 Deutsche Bank $76,882 $3,844.1 20 Germany 
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16 Regions Bank $72,444 $3,149.7 23 U.S. 
17 Unicredit $62,210 $2,592.1 24 Italy 
18 Fortis Bank $58,650 $1,725.0 34 Belgium 
19 Sumitomo $56,400 $1,151.0 49 Japan 
20 UBS $55,500 $3,468.8 16 Switzerland 
21 Bank of Scotland $53,500 $8,916.7 6 UK 
22 HSH Nordbank $52,550 $1,545.6 34 Germany 
23 Mizuho $51,284 $1,091.2 47 Japan 
24 Commerzbank $51,161 $2,046.5 25 Germany 
25 Debfa Bank $46,798 $2,600.0 18 Ireland 
26 First Tennessee $45,419 $1,297.7 35 U.S. 
27 Fifth Third Bank $44,478 $1,533.7 29 U.S. 


























28 State Bank $42,000 $2,100.0 20 U.S. 
29 Keybank $40,214 $1,827.9 22 U.S. 
30 DZ Bank $39,477 $1,038.9 38 Germany 
31 Citizens Bank $39,380 $1,790.0 22 U.S. 
32 Bank of Tokyo $35,900 $1,087.9 33 Japan 
33 Royal Bank of 
Canada 
$34,734 $1,085.4 32 Canada 
34 Allied Irish $34,700 $1,927.8 18 Ireland 
35 Bayerische Hypo $34,390 $802.1 43 Germany 
36 Natixis $32,817 $1,131.6 29 France 
37 BNP Paribas $31,275 $1,303.1 24 France 
38 Toronto Dominion $27,465 $1,445.5 19 Canada 
39 Bank of Nova Scotia $26,465 $661.6 40 Canada 
40 Arab Banking 
Corporation 
$26,350 $572.8 46 Bahrain 
41 Standard Chartered $25,100 $896.4 28 UK 
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42 Mitsubishi UFJ $24,457 $444.7 55 Japan 
43 Crédit Industriel et 
Commercial 
$23,910 $703.2 34 France 
44 Rabobank $23,751 $2,375.0 10 Netherlands 
45 BB&T $22,700 $2,522.2 9 U.S. 
46 Landesbank Baden $22,580 $1,411.3 16 Germany 
47 Ally Bank $21,600 $1,963.6 11 U.S. 
48 Marshall & Ilsley $21,045 $841.8 25 U.S. 
49 Countrywide $20,750 $6,916.7 3 U.S. 
50 Union Bank $20,100 $1,182.4 17 U.S. 
Source: Benmelech 2012. 
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